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Abstract. Despite an economic union premised on free movement across Europe, population statistics consistently
show that a very low percentage of Western Europeans migrate and settle permanently in other European countries. 
Middle class Europeans show a remarkable propensity to stay put in their native countries.  One can only conclude
that the European economic and social system functions in ways that scarcely resemble its founding principle of the
free movement of peoples.  This presentation reports on qualitative research in Brussels and Amsterdam which has
sought to understand the choices, career trajectories, and personal problems faced by professionals who have chosen
the path of free movement within Europe.  The study reveals the deep-seated national organization of life in even the
most internationalized-or Europeanized-of cities, particularly concerning housing, child education, and political
participation.  Favell focuses on the difficult struggle for "quality life" that is and always has given the advantage to
a rooted "bourgeois" conception of accumulation and social power.  In a Europe where the declining welfare state
and the all-powerful international economic system would seem to be overwhelming the nation-state, Favell
suggests that these hidden barriers to free movement in Europe lie at the heart of the resilience of the national as the
dominant form of social organization on the continent.
1. Introduction
This paper represents the first set of empirical results of a project designed to study the free
movement of professionals within the European Union. Brussels is an obvious location in which
to start, with its role as the putative capital of Europe and its very high resident population of
foreign EU citizens. Yet in many ways it is an exceptional location. Although one of the core
missions of the European Union has been to break down barriers to free movement in Europe, a
surprisingly low number of Europeans move and permanently settle outside their country of
origin, particularly when we compare the EU to free movement within the United States of
America. I explore the hypothesis that we can understand this reluctance to move by considering
the ‘informal’ barriers to integration experienced by European residents in their everyday life in
foreign cities. I take a close look, therefore, at the experience of foreign EU residents in Brussels
on the housing and labor market, as parents with children, in terms of welfare, medical servicesand retirement, as political participants in local elections, and as consumers of particular services
in the city. The research centers on 20 in-depth interviews with European residents of diverse
backgrounds, along with background research on the policy response of the city-region and on
the services provided by ‘expat’ oriented businesses in the city. The research in Brussels has
been complemented by exploratory comparative work in the city of Amsterdam
The research also addresses a number of other key academic issues. It offers a novel approach to
the study of globalization and Europeanization, by seeking to humanize - through intimate oral
history and participant observation methods - many of the sweeping exaggerations made by
sociologists and economic geographers of globalization. I take a skeptical look at just how
possible it is to live out the ultra-mobile global or transnational family lives predicated for these
people, who are wrongly classed as ‘elites’. I offer evidence on the participation of foreign
European residents in the gentrification of a typical post-industrial city in Europe. I also seek to
operationalize categories and theories more familiar from the study of the integration of non-
European ‘ethnic minority’ populations in Europe. Finally, the study offers a good deal of
skeptical evidence about the reality of European citizenship and Europeanization in Europe.
I find that Brussels offers a relatively high access to ‘quality of life’ benefits for foreign
residents. This openness is due to the exceptional combination of a cosmopolitan, multicultural
bi-national nature, its European role, and its deregulated markets. As a case, it exposes some of
the limitations of other seemingly open ‘global’ cities like Amsterdam and Paris. The report only
offers inconclusive evidence on the explanation of the limited rates of free movement in Europe,
but it does show in detail how complicated a long term foreign settlement is for committed freemovers, even in a city as open and easy to settle in as Brussels. I predict that a full scale study on
the free movement of professionals in Europe will reveal just how deeply embedded are
nationally-specific and locally-rooted forms of urban life in Europe, and that this is the
underlying secret of the resilience of European nation-states in an age of apparent nation state
decline and globalization.
2. Conceptual Issues
The study of foreign resident professionals in Brussels is an excellent strategic research site for a
number of key research questions taken from the current literature in various different disciplines
and sub-fields. Here, I will outline the contours of these bigger questions underlying the study.
2.i. The puzzle of free movement in the EU
Despite an economic union premised on free movement (of capital, services, goods and persons),
and increasing kinds of mobility across Europe (retirement migration, student mobility, tourism,
cross-border shopping and so forth), official population statistics have consistently reported that
a very low percentage of West European migrate and settle permanently in other European
countries (OECD-SOPEMI 2000: 31-32). This percentage is, with the exception of Belgium and
Luxembourg, well under 5% in all countries, and well behind percentages of non-West European
migrants. Amazingly, in highly ‘global’ internationalized countries such as the Netherlands (a
country which regularly tops globalization indexes; see Kearney 2001), or Britain (home of
London, the favourite ‘global city’ example in Europe; see Taylor 2000), the figure is under
1.5% (Eurostat 1997; Koslowski 1994, 2000; see Appendix 3). Working figures used in official
statements by the cabinet of Commissioner Diamantopoulou, which is responsible for labormobility issues, suggest that each year only 0.4% of EU citizens move to another member state
to work each year; this is compared to 2.4% in the USA. Discounting ongoing working class
migration from the south, and growing retirement migration to the south, we are left with the fact
that middle class Europeans show a remarkable propensity to stay put in their native countries.
When put alongside the rates of internal economic mobility or persons in North America, one
can only conclude that the European economic and social system – on the question of free
movement of persons at the very least – must function in ways that scarcely resemble at all the
free movement premises of its founding principles (on US mobility trends, see Fischer 2001).
Certain qualifications need to be made. International migration data – of the kind documented by
the annual OECD-SOPEMI reports – is notoriously unreliable when measuring mobility that
does not fit neatly into its definition of an act of international migration (more than one year
official settled residence, plus de-registration of residency back home). Mobility and cross-
border movement in Europe 2000 is surely much more significant than it was in the mid 1970s or
80s. But even allowing for this, there is an obvious puzzle here, given the economic incentives
for movement. Much concern has been expressed in EU circles about the dangers of asymmetric
shocks to national economies, particularly as a consequence of European Monetary Union
(EMU): business will move to wherever it is most viable to locate, and people will follow the
economic opportunities, stripping countries of human resources, or burdening others with new
influxes. EU economists, meanwhile, assume this mechanism will come into effect, in order to
model how an integrated Europe will deal with such shocks. Yet the figures apparently do not
bear these assumptions out. Why is this?Focusing on intra-EU migrants in cities would obviously change the picture: percentages will
rise dramatically. We may then be able to speculate about transposing models of internal national
migration to the EU scenario: of movement from periphery (provincial) regions to centre
(international) cities, and the relation of this spatial mobility to social mobility (Watson 1964;
Fielding 1995). Is there an ‘escalator’ phenomenon here, as there would be at national level?
More importantly, is it an escalator for individuals to surpass what they would have achieved by
staying at home?
The EU has, if nothing else, worked tirelessly to break down formal barriers to free movement of
workers: both in terms of legal reform (on discriminatory practices, recognition of qualifications,
access to benefits) and in terms of ‘citizen’ information and advice services (Siegel 1999).
Obvious practical targets that remain are the monopolistic national organisation of certain
professions, and the non-transferability of retirement funds around national welfare state
systems. But we might easily hypothesise any number of ‘hidden’ or ‘informal’ barriers to
successful free movement at a social or cultural level. Even the most casual traveller around
Europe quickly understands that the continent remains a babel of national cultures, which
demands of any European an extraordinarily high level of nationally specific ‘know how’ or
‘local knowledge’ to feel comfortable living and working outside their country of origin. Could
this be the underlying reason for the lack of intra-European migration? When combined with the
probability of formidable professional barriers, there is a strong case for focusing study here.
Yet Brussels, on the face of it, presents itself as a dramatic counter example to this general
reluctance to move. Its high population of resident professional Europeans (which accounts forbetween 10 and 15% of the total city population) suggests that if successful free movement is not
possible here then where could be it possible? Studying what makes Brussels special – perhaps
in comparison with other similarly open, international cities – may enable spelling out the
conditions of a genuine free movement, while understanding better its ‘hidden’ limitations. This
approach leads the focus of the study away from ‘eurocrats’ as such. Fonctionnaires, who have
mainly been recruited as a group through national concours and now have jobs for life, are not
good examples of free movers, who typically made individual decisions to migrate for
professional reasons, and whose positions are often unfixed and unpredictable in nature. It also
leads the study away from the already well-studied example of highly structured international
mobility within multinational corporations: the people usually referred to by the term ‘expats’.
Here, again, such employees are usually treated as a group whose mobility is usually built in
structurally to their careers within the company, often on short rotations from one country to
another. The structures provide by working within international organisations and corporations
are thus in a sense structures which shelter these employees from the true conditions and choices
of free movement; they are less interesting for this present study. I do include such people
(fonctionnaires, career expats) within my sample, but they are peripheral to my focus of
attention.
The real focus, then, will be to understand the choices, career trajectories and personal problems
faced by professionals who have individually chosen the path of individual free movement
within Europe. To understand constraints on movement, it is necessary to understand the various
issues they face in recreating a ‘normal’ pattern of professional and domestic life as aconsequence of moving to work in the foreign city. But there are likely to be significant benefits
as well costs.
2.ii. Eurocities or global cities?
The historical economic geography of Europe suggests that the continent developed through the
concentration of wealth in a central broad band of old, affluent cities running from Northern
Italy, through Switzerland, up through the Rhineland to the cities of the north west (Therborn
1995: 181-93; Dunford 1998; Bagnasco and Le Galès 1997). Cities enjoyed wealth and power
through their relative independence from nation states, the local rootedness of their populations,
their inclusive welfarist orientation, and their geographical proximity in the building of cross-
border ties and networks (Kaelble 1990: 59-74). Brussels, which so often puts itself at the ‘heart’
of Europe, has clearly benefited from its location and its identity in this sense. One only needs to
look at its centrality at the centre of the developing high speed train network to appreciate this
elementary point of geography. Yet this stable, territorial arrangement of wealth and power is
challenged by the new models of global city networks in the ‘information age’, which suggest
that wealth no longer needs to be accumulated in fixed points centered on established cities and
connections. Rather, it can be mobile between very distant points, and hence businesses and
people themselves are likely to opt out of local rootedness in cities and regions. (Castells 1993;
Taylor and Hoyler 2000; Kotkin 2000). Some, like Castells, argue that European cities’ inability
to move with the times is leaving its economies stranded in the new age (Castells 1997: 401-
403). But it may also be that he is missing the point about the specificity and durability of the
older European model (see also Mann 1998; Fligstein and Merand 2001) .The tension at stake here runs through attempts by cities to struggle against and/or harness
globalization by promoting local modes of governance through ‘glocalization’, combining
national, regional and local government power with national and international business interests
(Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner 1999). At a more human level, the tension also runs through the
obvious distinction between settled, accumulation-based models of classic ‘bourgeois’ life, and
the economic strategies of the highly mobile (on this, see the ultra-libertarian manifesto of
Angell 2000). When city planners try to bolster arguments about location and quality of life in
their efforts to attract businesses or retain highly qualified staff, they are in effect trying to square
this circle. Brussels, where the Region is highly aware of the implications of these questions on
its status as a prosperous business location and ‘emergent’ global city, offers an excellent site for
studying these questions at both the structural and human level (see also Baeten 2000).
2.iii. Humanizing the sociology and economic geography of globalization
The economic geography literature, however, has on the whole proceeded apace with scant
attention to the human dimension of global city issues. Flows and networks between locations
are measured by counting the number of offices corporation have in different cities, measuring
foreign direct investment and information exchange, or by quantitatively charting shifts in
business from production to service industries (Taylor, Walker and Beaverstock 2000; Castells
1997; Sassen 2000; Esping-Andersen 1999). But rarely is any kind of human face given to these
macro-level transactions and data-sets. The ever-growing mobility and migration of
professionals is always assumed to be an integral part of these flows (Sassen 2001), but more
often than not the mobility of individuals alongside capital, services and goods is simply deduced
from the macro-level data. It is rarely asked whether real individuals, with everyday family livesand human relationships, could actually live out the lives predicted for them by the macro
economic data about flows and networks (a partial exception: Beaverstock 2001b). Moreover,
the decline of the nation state, signaled and in some cases celebrated by these global theorists, is
almost never checked against the basic everyday durability of nationally specific practices and
identities in organizing the behavior of people in Europe (Billig 1995).
The sociology of the global fares little better. Global functionalists have taken us beyond the
nation state into a postnational world of human rights and transnational politics (Meyer et al
1997; Boli and Ramirez 1997; Soysal 1994). But the macro-focus on policies and institutions has
nothing to say about whether this has changed persistent national differences in Europe in the
shape of the life-cycle, family life, professional careers, social practices, and so on (on these, see
Crouch 1999). Global Marxists have identified a transnational capitalist class running business
corporations, flying around the globe, and manipulating international organizations like the EU
to their own ends (Sklair 2001, van Apeldoorn 1999).
1 But again, the studies never penetrate
further than macro-level political economy, and a general cynicism about elites (an exception:
Burawoy et al 2000). Theoretical writers on globalization, meanwhile, have been guilty of a
terrible excess here (Bauman 1996; Hannerz 1996, Urry 2000, Papastergiadis 2000; see Favell
2001b). Increased world migration and mobility (a dubious assumption to begin with) has, for
these theorists, completely dissolved the stable structures of the nation-state-society. The world
according to them is now a compressed ‘postmodern’ time-space continuum of virtual flows and
                                                
1 Far better empirical studies assessing the emergence of a new European elite in conjunction with European
integration – minus the Marxist baggage - have however been done from a political sociology perspective. See the
collection in French, edited by Guiraudon (2000), and suggestive work by American scholars Neil Fligstein (1996;
1998) and Sid Tarrow (1995).networks that link up cities and cultures across the globe, creating new global identities and
politics.
But who exactly are the übermensch predicated by these theorists?
2 Do these people who
populate the niche marketing of in-flight magazines and global hotel chains really exist or live
out real lives? What are the human costs and consequences of this lifestyle? What has changed in
the everyday shape of their lives beyond the nation state? The only economic literature to
recognize this issue in a sensible, humanistic way is the human resources literature on
expatriation, which pragmatically puts at its core the management dilemmas of dealing with the
personal and family difficulties of dealing with mobility and relocation (Beaverstock 2001a).
This naturally focuses on the problems of following spouses and children, but also the
psychology of dealing with foreign culture and the weariness of distant family ties and contacts.
When adding these issues to the obvious difficulties linked to economic accumulation or
                                                
2 This was a question I first asked myself after picking up a copy of the global yuppie magazine Wallpaper* (*= “the
stuff that surrounds you”) for the first time in May 2000 – appropriate enough at that high temple of European
modernity, Frankfurt airport. Although this was undoubtedly the best looking, most entertaining, most intelligent in-
flight magazine I had ever read, I found it hard to believe that there really exists a ‘demographic niche’ for this
(now) wildly successful magazine. An archly ironic feature on the demise of the nation state summarized the attitude
of the magazine perfectly: “The nation state is so 20
th century. A rising regionalism around the world is dissolving
old national borders. The global city-region, cross-border region, and super region (presumably they mean the EU?)
is the new parlance of a borderless world of swashbuckling businessmen, high speed commuters and jetsetting
teenagers… (but) We must not ring the death knell of the nation state just yet. We will still suffer custom guards
pawing through our Vuitton bags after over-enthusiastic impulse splurges in duty-free airports. But if a borderless
world is truly in the making, then the tool of choice for the 21
st century cartographer won’t be the pencil but the
eraser. Wallpaper* patiently awaits the new World Atlas sans frontières” (‘The New World Order’, Wallpaper April
2000: 59-64). Or again, in a feature rating their favourite commuter helicopters and private jets in the way What
Car? rates automobiles, they rate their favorite airport landing: “If you want a truly multimedia experience, few
things beat flying back into London City Airport at tea-time Friday on the Crossair shuttle from Geneva. For the
well connected media tart, the final nerve wracking plunge past the glass-and-steel towers of Canary Wharf offers
the perfect opportunity to wave at half the commissioning editors in Britain… If only they’d let us switch on our
mobile phones we’d be able to hear what their cute little faces were mouthing back…” (‘Top 25’, Wallpaper May
2000). The magazine is edited in London by a Swede called Tyler Brûlé (sic), and a “UN-like” editorial team of
global free movers. The somewhat queasy feeling all this irony leads to can be linked to darker undercurrents. A
Swedish academic living in London pointed out to me how the aesthetic of Wallpaper – which is full of glistening
Aryan models in après ski wear, and modernist dreamworlds built of perfect kitchens, exotic holidays and soaringbuilding a career beyond the national, it is amazing that globalization theorists have been able to
get away with their sweeping generalizations about the effortless mobility of highly educated
professional ‘elites’. The Europe of free movement may offer a more realistic version of possible
transnational opportunities beyond the nation-state-society, but this is at best an unstudied
empirical question that demands something more than wild theoretical speculation. Exceptions to
this lack of research can, however, be found in French, in the interesting work of Tarrius (1992;
2000) and Wagner (1998).
This, then, is a further goal for this study: a genuine empirical study about the lives of the
prototypical European ‘fourmis’, the still anonymous and faceless heroes of the transnational
global theorists. Going beyond human resources management questions, I seek to map out in
intimate detail how living abroad has made alterations to career structures and everyday life that
would not have occurred had they stayed back home. Clearly there are costs as well as benefits to
stepping out from regular patterns of professional advancement; to leaving behind regular forms
of family life rooted in locality and national culture; or opting out from the cradle of national
welfare states, dedicated increasingly to protect only their own citizens from the effects of the
global economy. The one instance of a study that focuses on the human consequences of the new
economy in a similar way is Richard Sennett’s (1998) extraordinary study of the impact of the
post-industrial era on the lives of professional Americans, The Corrosion of Character. But are
these rootless and vulnerable euro-lives as difficult and potentially tragic as his work might
suggest? This study aims to find out.
                                                                                                                                                            
architecture  - owes much to dark and discredited pre-World War 2 ideas of European futurism (on this, see
Mazouwer 1998).2.iv. Comparing the integration of ‘ethnic’ and ‘elite’ migrants
A very different literature, however, has paid a great deal of attention to the fine-grained,
intimate ‘moving stories’ of migrants (Thomson 1999; King 1997, King 1998). The field in
question is migration studies. This literature has also been effective in revealing the way the
divergent backgrounds and experiences of migrants reveal the persistent national structures and
cultures of settled populations (Favell 1998). Following the life experiences of migrants is, in
fact, one of the best ways of gaining a perspective on the sedentary lifestyles of the vast majority
of people who do not move internationally. The study of ‘elite’ or professional international
migration is, however, peripheral to the main questions of migration studies (see, however, King
et al 2000; Salt 1992; Gaillard/Gaillard 1998). This field in Europe has been dominated by the
study of  working class, ‘ethnic’, non-European migrants: post-colonial, guest worker and
refugee migration, and the typical models of migration, settlement and integration that follow
from this. Behind most ideas of what happens to these migrants as they integrate into European
countries, is a model that owes much to the example of the USA and Canada, as the prototypical
ideal of countries of immigration (see Favell 2001).
The one-way narrative from immigration to (assimilated) citizenship that anchors this model has
been challenged in recent years by the anthropology and sociology of transnational migrants.
Transnational migrants, whose lives are often located neither fully in their new country of
residence nor back home where they came from, are often pointed to as the new heroes of a
‘globalization from below’ (Portes 1996; Glick Schiller et al 1995). The emphasis in this field on
their economic and cultural networks, the flow of business transactions and remittances, and
their political and social influence on events back home, has also opened the door to a newperception of such ‘ethnic’ migrants as educated and influential ‘elites’ and ‘pioneers’ (Portes
1999). One limitation is that transnational approaches notoriously have a hard time with the
classic question of assimilation and integration (Alba/Nee 1997). While tracking global or cross-
national networks, it is essential to recognize the simultaneous processes of settlement and
accommodation taking place as migrants continue to encounter the older style pressures to
integrate in their new national place of residence. Sometimes the tensions surrounding the
uncertain place of transnational migrants has led to the sort of outcomes - like ghetto formation,
defensive ethnic identity formation and socially downward assimilation - that would have been
noted in the past for more classic ‘ethnic’ immigrants (Portes/Zhou 1992).
But can the heroic tales of Asian astronauts or Hispanic diasporas offer a directly transposable
guide to the mobility of Europeans within the EU? There may indeed be something to learn from
applying this rich and developed literature to the case of professional European migrants within
the EU. The creative tension between the transformative impact of transnational networks and
identities, and older, more predictable processes of integration/accommodation might, in theory,
no less apply to professional migrants moving from Germany to the Netherlands, or Portugal to
Belgium. This, at least, is an open question posed by applying the typical framework of
migration theories to questions concerning the integration and participation of European
migrants in, say, Brussels or other international eurocities. Here, too, are cities with ample other
forms of migration and ethnic relations with which to compare and contrast. Applying a
migration studies problematic to professional European migrants in European cities leads to
typical integration questions: measuring their participation as economic and political actors in the
city, their social impact on the host country, questions of ‘ethnic’ identity or ghetto formation,their degree of socialization into local national culture(s), the persistence of ties and activities
elsewhere, and so on.
Plausible as this kind of approach may be, it remains an open question to what extent applying
such theories can be applied to the predominantly white, middle class European professional
‘class’. Global cities theories in fact are premised on identifying a sharp ‘polarization’ between
the new immigrant ‘ethnic’ underclasses who fill service industry opportunities in these cities,
and the emergent ‘global’ elites in the financial, media and service businesses at the other end of
the social scale (Sassen 2001). Although international in origin, these privileged, educated elites
are assumed to face none of the barriers and discriminations felt by poorer immigrants; nor are
they ever thought to be subject to the same coercive integratory pressures that ‘ethnic’ migrants
might face from their host nations. It is assumed that elite migrants are free to exploit the
opportunities of their transnational lifestyles and mobility with few of the obvious costs that
other, less privileged migrants face. Yet all of these assumptions – including whether they are in
fact ‘elites’ - need checking by tracing the actual migration origins, patterns and stories of the
new kind of European ‘transnational pioneer’.
2.v. The impact of foreigners on gentrification and change in cities
Urban geography has experienced a renaissance in recent years, charting among other things the
interlinked dynamics of change in post-industrial cities alongside the gentrification of residential
pockets within the inner city. Studies have focused on how a young set of middle class urban
pioneers have sought cultural diversity and new urban lifestyles in inner city areas abandoned by
a previous generation during suburbanization. This has led on to new forms of political activismand a dramatic cultural transformation of certain cities (Ley 1996). Brussels offers a particularly
sharp scenario of this kind, in that this is a city that faced both dramatic large-scale
suburbanization and steep industrial decline in past decades (Kesteloot 2000). Poorer immigrants
here, like in the US and Canada, have played a major role in re-habilitating abandoned parts of
the city with commerce and street life. Middle class urban pioneers have followed them back into
the central city. What is interesting for the present study is the not inconsiderable role of foreign
European residents in leading the gentrification process in certain neighborhoods of Brussels
(van Criekingen 1997). Moreover, this has led to a somewhat different kind of multicultural
interaction, leading to new types of housing and commercial development, and new forms of
culture in certain parts of the city. The study of housing patterns can indeed be a proxy for the
study other social and political processes. It is for this reason one of the central empirical foci of
this study (see Bourdieu 2000). No other city in Europe has quite seen, as Brussels has, the
emergence of distinctly European neighborhoods within the multicultural mosaic typical of
international cities. This new social geography - which combines the features of an ethnic
enclave and a gentrifying middle class - offers a rich new field of study. One may also consider
the potential comparisons to be drawn between Ixelles or Sint Kathelijne in Brussels and de Pijp
or Jordaan in Amsterdam, Shoreditch or Islington in London, and Bastille or Oberkampf in Paris,
sites where similar dynamics could be observed in the last decade or so.
2.vi. The emergence of multicultural spaces in national societies
The emergence of such multinational enclaves within multicultural cities leads to consideration
of the nature of these new Euro-enclaves within the nationalized space of the society around
them, particular the freedom and empowerment it may furnish those able to step outside thecaging power structures of the nation-state. Again, taking its cue from the impact of non-
European ‘ethnic’ migrants in western cities, certain writers have sought to identify
transnationalism with specific locations that emerge within cities (Keith/Pile 1993; Massey 1994;
M.P.Smith 2001). These transnational spaces represent the nodes of cross-national networks,
linking together cultural, economic and political activities in the city with the diasporas and
transnational communities around the world. They suggest the possibility of cross-national
‘inter-stitial’ social power (Mann 1993), that draws on the ability of free movers to benefit from
and identify with the space created by their non-national ‘anomie’, their ‘not-belonging’ to any
one nation or the other. Do the new Euro-spaces function in such a way? Or are Euro-movers just
a milder, modern day version of Arendt’s statelessness, stranded outside the national structures
that make social and political struggles meaningful? The question can be specified further by
looking at to what extent the new kinds of commercial and cultural activities that take place here
– often in the form of shops, clubs, pubs and restaurants – represent a similar transnational
challenge to the overwhelmingly nationalized activities of European cities. Are they creating
specifically ‘Euro’ spaces, or are they just a European version of the generic global market? In
Brussels, as I have noted, there is the extraordinary confluence of multinational, multicultural
and multileveled influences, that perhaps generate even more space or opportunity for the
presence of the transnational in the city.
2.vii. Is there such a thing as European citizenship?
A great deal of academic effort has been spent in the last decade in specifying the counterfactual
conditions for the development of a ‘true’ European citizenship. This is taken almost
unanimously to be the core normative requirement for the emergence of a European democracy,and European public voice worthy of the EU integration project (Weiler 1998; Wiener 1997;
Meehan 1993). The EU has led the way with numerous attempts to bring itself close to the
public, and encourage a sense of European citizenship among apathetic national voters. Foreign
European EU citizens have the rights to vote in local elections across the EU – which in Brussels
means the highly localized, but important, Commune level elections every six years. Uniquely
among European cities, the high percentage of European residents, coupled with their
concentration in certain communes, in fact creates the possibility of a serious electoral impact of
this population on Belgian politics as a whole (Bousetta and Swyngedouw 1999). Brussels thus
offers a natural setting for exploring the reality of European citizenship. Do foreign residents
vote, hold opinions, or participate in any way in the Belgian political system around them? After
all, this is a highly euro-conscious population, many of whom work in some contact with the
European institutions. If there is no real sense of emerging European citizenship here, then where
in Europe could there be (see also the work of Strudel 1999)?
2.viii. Assessing the Europeanization of Europeans
Finally, there is the related but much wider issue of the emergence of genuinely Europeanized
behavior, beyond the national customs, identities, practices that European nationals have
inherited from their nation-states of origin. Most of the anthropological literature on
Europeanization suggests in fact limited evidence of Europeanization in this sense (see
Borneman/Fowler 1997). It appears limited to sport (European football leagues and the free
movement of players), to tourism, to the Europeanization of restaurant cuisine styles, to certain
cross-border activities in some regions. Brussels again can be thought of as a privileged site of
research into this question, given the high European population and the prima facie likelihoodthat residents here will be living a more Europeanized life than others. This is a premise that
should by no means be limited to eurocrats (as in, for example, Shore 2000, Abélès 1996). For
reasons to do with the structure of their careers, fonctionnaires will only represent a certain
limited form of Europeanization in their behavior. Beyond the rhetoric, is a Europe of Europeans
really being built? And again, there is that feeling: if this is not happening in Brussels, then
where?
It is my hope that a Brussels-based investigation can offer a way of addressing all eight of these
wider issues.
3.i. Pioneers of professional free movement in Europe
The use of oral history techniques, and an oblique sampling procedure, led to findings that
revealed unusual life stories and pioneer trajectories very different to the kind of heavily
structured migrations predicted by the literature on ‘elite’ professional migration and
multinational corporations. Such an approach puts the emphasis back on explaining migration –
and, in this study, settlement - as the decision of individuals, in which very ‘thick’, personalized
factors are crucial to our understanding. It also takes us a million miles from the over-used, lazy
academic metaphors about ‘flows’, ‘connectivities’ and ‘networks’ that dominate all the global
studies talk about migration and mobility.
As my discussion has stressed throughout, it is also a lazy generalization to describe these ‘free
movers’ as ‘elites’. This is not the ‘transnational capitalist class’; they are not the glossy
characters pictured in the IT, banking, airline and mobile telephone adverts in Fortune 500 orThe Economist magazines. Their general social origins and careers of these people locates them
as fairly average middle class professionals, who are often high achievers from modest
backgrounds. Although these eurostars are, in an important sense, the rare-to-find heroes of the
Europeanization of European society, they are not the future power brokers and decision makers
of the continent, pictured in naïve image of European stagiare parties and Eurocrat socializing.
3
These ‘elites’ are still much more likely to emerge through conventional national channels, in
which national social class origins and networks will remain crucial (Bourdieu 1979; 1989). The
people I speak with did not end up in Brussels through following some mainstream fast-track in
their nation state of origin. On the contrary, they came to Brussels for idiosyncratic reasons:
sometimes as a somewhat marginal ‘alternative’ to a career path via in the national capital
(typical of the French or British); sometimes because of a international idealism (very typical of
Germans, Dutch, Scandinavians); sometimes for adventure and change (a number of respondents
‘gave up’ careers already established at home, choosing wisdom and experience over tougher
more frenetic careers there); sometimes (as with the Irish and the Southern Europeans) because
Brussels has now become an established path to social and professional mobility. The
opportunities are there in Brussels, but the settlement process is often accidental; none would
have predicted the dour initial idea they had of Brussels would metamorphosize into such a
positive long term identification with the city. Yet very few expressed any regrets with their life-
                                                
3 Interestingly, the popular US news magazine Time ran two big features on the new ‘eurostars’ and the new Europe
in 2000/2001, ‘Fast Forward Europe’ (Winter Special 2000/2001) and ‘Generation Europe: What today’s young
think about life, love, technology – and being European’ (April 2, 2001). Some Americans are perhaps waking up to
the fact that there is an internationalization process going on in Europe that is not yet another generic form of
Americanization/globalization, but something rather different and opposed to American cultural hegemony. The
latter article appropriately enough begins its story at a multinational stagiare party: “Young and restless adults are
reinventing the Continent’s identity – and their own… they’re young, they’re cosmopolitan and they don’t have
much use for the borders that have divided Europe for centuries. Inside the mind of the Continent’s rising
generation’.choices (though it must be said this is often the case in interviews-based migration research; see
King et al 2000).
The isolation of their ‘weird’ decision to live and work abroad, in fact perhaps accounts for much
of the reluctance of their peer groups back home to move around Europe. This is clear when
considering the British, for example, in Brussels – who are, without exception, self-styled
exceptions to the dominant Euro-skepticism that prevails back home. When Rob and Rachel put
all their belongings in a car in northern England, and embarked on a new life in Brussels, it was
seen by friends as a dramatic move. It is, of course, a move much less familiar than the idea of
Australia or North America, despite the ease and distance involved in going to Brussels. They
moved because they felt they could coordinate careers in Brussels, be close to home, but also
keep alive an international dimension to their lives that would fast disappear in England (they
had studied languages at university, almost a sine qua non, for British eurostars). Although, on
all these issues, this makes Brussels a more rational destination than traveling half the world in
search a better life, their choice remains an exception. Very few other British people would move
to Belgium as a couple; nearly all came originally as single people. There is clearly a contrast to
be drawn here with the fairly typical Irish story, reported above, in which Tom and Sinead
coordinated their careers and migration choice through the well-developed Irish network, that
has turned Brussels (as well as Paris and Amsterdam) into more desirable destinations than
London, and other English-language destinations further afield. John and Ellen, another English
couple, did indeed come as a couple. But again, their story was one of making an exceptional
decision in favor of adventure and ‘something different’ in their 30s after establishing careers at
home.The German, Dutch, Scandinavian and French people I spoke with all narrated the move to
Brussels as an exceptional decision, cutting themselves off from their national peer groups, and
the kind of standard career laid out for them during university at home. In some cases their
commitment followed some experience of travel as students, but there was also a sense of
frustration and boredom with the kind of national options they faced that propelled them abroad.
Only among the Southern Europeans did I find ‘purer’ examples of eurostars ‘rationally’
following a clear international option within the EU of free movement to leave home for
professional reasons. Natalia, a social worker, Pedro, a research scientist, Maria and Miguel, a
lobbyist and IT specialist respectively, had all followed the straightforward path through student
opportunities to an international career. So, interestingly, had Saïd, from France, an exceptional
case in both national and ‘ethnic’ terms (it is very rare to find European nationals of ethnic
minority origin who have been willing and able to free move abroad – for the simple enough
reason that it is hard enough already trying to ‘integrate’ at home). Natalia and Gianni, a very
successful architect, had explicitly moved because their professional opportunities were limited
or blocked at home. Ambition and cultural openness had led them to establishing very strong
roots in Brussels, and remarkable, international and Belgian social networks. They had also
carved out impressive careers in professions that are a very tight at the national level. Pedro and
Miguel expressed much more indifferent attitudes to Brussels, that would be more typical of the
rootless international free mover, weighing up future international possibilities within
professions (high tech science, and IT) that are very internationalized in their structure. These
characters are much closer to the ideal type of free movers predicated by the EU free movement
policies and self-help literature. It should be expected that rising numbers of young SouthernEuropeans will move to the north for these reasons. Yet the experiences of another Italian,
Caterina, who also worked in (medical) scientific research, underlines that these heroes of free
movement also feel the weight of being away from home. Caterina, who is the from a rich
northern city in Italy, recognized how peculiar how life was compared to friends back, whom she
visits once a year. Single and independent, she had comfortably adjusted to the benefits of a very
different international life in Ixelles, that was not in any way comprehensible to her peers back
home. It should be noted that all my respondents from Southern Europe were originally from
fairly well-off middle class backgrounds and affluent cities: it is not a migration particularly
centered on provincial or less advantaged people, in distinction to the provincial origins of most
British or French.
The transition from sojourner to settler obviously too plays a substantial role in limiting the
numbers of intra-European migrants. Even with open professional opportunities, high relative
quality of life and no great sense of real discrimination or exclusion, the taste of life abroad can
easily fail to convert into a longer term stay. Some, for sure, are likely to be peripatetic movers
for many years. Janet, who worked for a multinational, had been recruited into their expat career
structure, having begun as a free moving journalist in Brussels. This had led her to embrace the
ideology of the firm that foresees regular international redeploying for that sub-sector of the
company designated as international high-flyers. She had correspondingly adjusted her view on
Brussels: as one of enjoyable indifference. No commitment was foreseen. Although she herself
was a ‘free mover’, the career movements of most expats are for this reason not a good indicator
of ‘free movement’ potential within Europe – where the multinationals, not the migrants, are
making the decisions about the destinations involved. However, other anecdotal evidencesuggests that ‘personal’ factors – such as relationships, family connections, or cultural attraction
– does play a factor in the increasing with of multinational employees to exercise some degree of
control and choice over their international careers. Working for Shell or Unilever should not be
like being deployed wherever they tell you to go, like a soldier in the army.
Other sojourners do develop strong attachments to the place, while recognizing future moves are
likely. Even eventual settlers often have strong assumptions about the temporariness of the stay;
even if the slow engrenage of building a life in the city – getting used to neighborhoods, buying
household items, looking for new flats – indicates a rather different kind of experience. Others
who may prove to be sojourners nevertheless experience the period as an indefinite period, with
perhaps a three or five year plan in mind. It is very difficult to live anywhere effectively without
at least settling to this degree. With the exception of interviewees such as Janet and Pedro, life in
Brussels was not seen as a prelude to a ‘global’ move (wherever opportunity takes you). For
most, the attraction of settling and committing to Brussels was real  – although many recognized
the well-known ‘five year’ make-or-break barrier. The permanent decision – well described by
Amy and Stephen’s ‘big’ decision described above – is also one that makes a big qualitative
difference to life in the city. Suddenly, the casual social networks that come so easily to new
arrivers in the city become, as they had for Natalia, Caterina, Gianni and others, a constitutive
part of one’s well-being in the city. It should be noted that meeting people in Brussels is
remarkably easy: Irish pubs, salsa bars and endless house party invitations function to knit
together people who in another big city could expect to endure initial periods of isolation.So much of what is enabled by the Brussels context is exceptional by European standards.
Nowhere else in Europe is there a city where you can actually point out European residential
neighborhoods on a map! Other bigger, faster, tougher cities make it much harder for expats to
socialize outside of their own national group, outside the corporate life, or outside the ghettos of
international organizations. Very few other cities are so forgiving of indifference to the nation
state around it, while so open to cultural diversity. Very few European cities are so easy on a
practical level (in terms of finding housing, social networks, setting up an everyday life), or have
such a vast range of expat services. Without these conditions, we can scarcely expect free
movement to develop dramatically in Europe – these are features much more familiar to major
American cities. Yet building that everyday life in the long term – living the trans-national, or a-
national way - is hard enough even in Brussels. Even eurostars remain pioneers, oddities within
the European nation-state-society system.
3.ii. The elusive European dream: transnational mobility and bourgeois settlement
Is the international dimension of a European city such as Brussels just a generic aspect of its
emergent ‘global city’ properties? Answering this through my data of course takes the work in a
different qualitative direction that the typical kinds of economic geography measuring such
things through business flows and transactions. The crucial question must be whether the
lifestyles of European free movers in any way are to combine the benefits of located ‘bourgeois’
accumulation as settlement and commitment, and the ‘nouveau’ wealth of ever-moving global
capital. Both types, in any case, have been historically dominated by national elites. The most
ambitious and successful of the free movers may, indeed, exemplify the ‘nouveau’ path to
mobility, but even the most enthusiastic of international career builder generally recognizes thatthey have given up entitlements to the benefits of a nationally rooted lifestyle along the way.
Brussels, however, offers a different kind of opportunity, far closer to the European free
movement ideal: that stable, rooted, essentially would-be ‘bourgeois’ middle class professionals,
might yet achieve more than they would have at home by moving and settling in a different
European city, without giving up on the precious, settled European ‘quality of life’ that comes
from ‘belonging’ somewhere. This is, of course, a move that many Americans make several
times during their careers around the North American continent, without a great deal of
hesitation or sentimentality about where ‘they come from’.
Many of the people I spoke with were just free movers of the rootless kind: career opportunities
might prevail over the benefits of settled life in Brussels, where they still felt little access to the
‘place’ as it would be experienced by Belgians. For those in IT (Miguel), science (Pedro),
working for multinationals (Janet), Brussels indeed is merely an instance of the ‘global’ – an
interchangeable city of structural opportunities created by its place in the global capitalist
‘system’. Their experience of the city was linked to this. Others, obviously, linked the dynamic
of their careers with Brussels in a specific way – because the work had intimate connections with
the international and European organizations in the city. Those most invested in the city,
however, were those whose domestic and cultural lifestyles, as well as their careers, were
enabled in some way by the city, and this city specifically. A majority of the eurostars fall into
this category, which suggests something very different from the global city idea of
‘interchangeable’ cities with similar structural career opportunities and indifference to the choice
of location.It is in this sense, that the idea of a truly eurocity might emerge. Residents who have invested in
a city because of its combination of career and lifestyle opportunities, have also done so because
they see they can have access to the kind of life they want there and not elsewhere – that moving
further will only reduce or destroy this possibility. This in turn will call for commitment,
investment and identification with this specific place. National residents of eurocities have often
long recognized this themselves: that building the life they want in these competitive, desirable
cities, alongside the career and wealth accumulation they desire, requires a long term investment
in the city as place, sometimes strategizing over the long run to obtain the right kind of housing,
location for children, access to local benefits, and so on. All this, in turn, depends on a high
degree of identification with the place. The wealth of European cities has historically been linked
to this sense of local, regional investment in place: building ‘bourgeois’ rootedness and
accumulation, alongside the ability to be open to business networks, transactions and travel with
other places. Property ownership, obviously, is the most visible aspect of this. But equally
important is the sense that any activity will be enhanced by its specific location and involvement
in the city where it is located.
How might this work for eurostars as a new form of European bourgeoisie, who have moved to
build careers, yet also seek a stable sense of settlement and investment in a specific place? For
some, it is a question of Brussels as a uniquely accessible ‘third city’ for couples who would find
it difficult to settle in any one of their national countries of origin. Andreas, a Norwegian with an
Italian wife, expressed very clearly his sense that Brussels enabled a negotiation of his family life
to suited them well, despite the distance from home. Correspondingly, they had sought out a way
of settling in the city that could lead to a much longer term stay there than could be expectedfrom the ‘objective’ attractions of the city. The active choice of moving into a ‘European’
neighborhood in Ixelles was part of this, as it had been for Caterina, Janet, Tom and Sinead, and
others. Settlement in Brussels as a third city had led Dutch political activist, Rik Jellema, towards
his deep political investment in the city: his French wife and he had found that the city enabled
their family with children to evolve as if the city were their original home.
Brussels, then, in some ways may offer the combination of conditions – an accessible local
quality of life, together with multi-national openness – that enable original and dynamic careers,
alongside attractive and settled lifestyles. Gunther, the German consultant was a good example:
using his expertise of travel and international perspectives in his work in marketing for German
companies, shuttling back and forth for work between Munich and Brussels, while enjoying a
very high quality of family life in Brussels. He had built new business opportunities, and a
successful Brussels lifestyle, out of an initial settlement that his followed his wife’s more typical
Brussels-type work in an international organization (in this case the EU). Others who had made
successful businesses out of life and work in Brussels – such as Dave, the businessmen, or
Gianni the architect - had combined successfully the business edge often possessed by foreigners
in a new environment, with a specific personal adaptation and investment in the kind of lifestyle
that the place afforded.
One of the factors that makes Brussels a viable eurocity – with its own distinctive features that
lead to original and productive economic and political activities – is the ease of sociability in the
city. Its size, the abundance of localities, the concentration of other Europeans, all held enable
European residents conversant with the place to build opportunities specific to the location ontop of any that might have simply followed from the move abroad or the ‘global city’ location. A
popular evening gathering place like ‘The Bank’, a slightly up-market Irish pub in the ‘yuppie’
neighborhood of Châtelain in Ixelles, on one level offers a ‘local’ for residents wishing to meet
and relax with other foreign Europeans. But, as with other similar locations in the city, it also
functions as a site for building networks out of sociability: it is a place where a good deal of the
freelance lobbying and professional information is circulated, as well as knowledge about job
openings and new careers.
For sure, there is a tension here tension between mobility opportunities and accumulation
through settlement, investment and identification, which runs through most, if not all, the free
moving lifestyles I have encountered. Brussels is perhaps unique in offering a sense to many that
they can settle and build something here as a eurocity, while also capitalizing on the mobility
opportunities they found by leaving behind ‘home’, and the ‘open’, ‘global’ or ‘cosmopolitan’
dimensions of this city. For many years, though, this sense of settlement and commitment can be
a fragile one, seen still in a temporary light. But many do appreciate the benefits of achieving
some degree of rootedness. Though many of them are single, or have no children, and some
clearly are likely to move again, there are very few examples of the ‘pure’ rootless free mover
envisaged in the flows and networks of global city scholars.
Yet for all the growing possibilities of combining mobility with settlement, successful long term
investment and settlement is still hampered by other factors. The ideal of European free
movement, in Brussels as elsewhere, will always be hampered by a lingering sense of dislocation
from the normal patterns of social and family life that international mobility seems to involve.Free movers, despite being fairly average middle class professional people, find themselves
living a lifestyle that their families and peer groups back home no longer understand; and they
find that many of the lifestyle choices they make in the new city are also very different to those
of ‘indigenous’ nationals around them. As I have shown, this leads to the conscious adoption of
lifestyles that lie outside the normal settled ‘family’ lifestyles that might be expected – with a
high number of single or childless lifestyles – even though sustaining a relationship or  having
children in Brussels as a foreigner is not hugely different or more difficult than for a national.
The sense that they have ‘opted out’ of something will also affects their long term security over
the lives they have chosen. All investment and settlement requires some longer term security of
some kind. It is a crucial fact about free movement in Europe that those that move internationally
are often punished severely by the national welfare states which they are seen to have
abandoned. This factor does not weigh in the free mobility of persons in North America, where
welfare in any case has to be personalized and portable, and public provision is negligible.
Middle class professionals in Europe, though, are the very core of national welfare states: they
are the people that pay for it, and usually those that most benefit it. They are also the class that
most often proves most decisive in political elections. Free movers opt out of this game, and
hence sometimes out of its dividends. Though the longer term costs are not something that
emerge as a conscious reason for them to doubt their initial move – which invariably was made
to improve income and career opportunities, as well as to open up international experience – they
are perhaps factors which weigh subconsciously on other average middle class people who
perhaps lack the same sense of adventure, or who have opted at an earlier age to settle and
accumulate. Free movers encounter these costs later: in concerns over retirement and the fact thatno real pan-national structures ultimately exist to guarantee their ‘social security’. Free movers
learn over time that they are, in this sense at least, left to their own resources. It is perhaps this in
the end that causes that sense of separation from the kind of ‘national’ lives within national
welfare state that they have left behind. People who perhaps never saw themselves as doing
anything particularly remarkable, start to live more precarious, genuinely extraordinary, pioneer
lives.
6. Conclusion: Eurostars and Eurocities
One of the most visible manifestations of Europeanization has been the success of the Thalys and
Eurostar train links that now speed regularly between Paris, London, Amsterdam and Brussels.
Part of a developing trans-European network (TEN) of high speed rail links sponsored by the
European Union, the passengers of these trains perhaps offer another distinctive sample of the
highly visible, yet still mysteriously unknown individuals on which this study is focused: the
‘eurostars’ at the vanguard of European free movement. Adapting my marketing niche research
strategy, we might find that their lifestyles, consumer profile and cosmopolitan attitudes can be
read off from the editorial content and advertisements found in the glossy on-board magazines.
Their carefully targeted marketing effort is, in other words, pitched at what they see as an
emergent future population of ultra-mobile cross-national professionals and upper bracket
tourists that ride these fast trains. The multi-lingual text and the polyglot cultural references
reflect the emergent ease of cross-national exchange and travel in this highly interlinked part of
North West Europe. Yet the emergent European culture reflected in these pages also remains
anchored in the national specificities of the four capitals, in which each city markets itself as thedistinct embodiment of national treasures and cultural excellence, alongside proud invocations of
their international openness and diversity.
Even at its most cosmopolitan, then, Europe remains an imagined landscape of national cities,
national cultures, and national differences. The resilient, even thriving distinctiveness of
European national cultures has been overlooked and downplayed by a generation of
‘globalization’ scholars concerned with impersonal macro-level structural changes in the
economy and international political system that are said to signal the inexorable decline of the
nation state in Europe and elsewhere. The vast and growing literature on ‘global cities’ points
towards the major cities of Europe as the very locus of this process. Yet these national capitals
remain the essence and embodiment of the distinct national cultures in which they are centered,
even as they also embody a far wider range of internationalized and Europeanized cultures than
their still solidly nationalized hinterlands.
This study is part of a wider investigation into the human dimension of globalization and
Europeanization. It sets out to see to what extent foreign European residents of major European
cities still experience barriers in their access to social and economic participation in everyday
aspects of life in the city, such as the housing market, education, welfare institutions, consumer
services and political representation. Just as the street names, neighborhood identities and
architectural features of capital cities embody an implicit, sedimented ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig
1995; Latour/Hermant 1998) that is imprinted into the very structure of the city – a coded social
history which only fully socialized nationals of the country are ever likely to understand – these
other everyday structures may be organized and structured in ways that perpetuate nationalizedforms of ‘know-how’ that create a ‘natural’ national monopoly on access to the ‘quality of life’
benefits of life there. These informal barriers reflect what can be thought of in terms of the
heavily nationalized ‘structure of everyday life’ (echoing de Certeau 1990, and Braudel 1992)
that I suspect lies at the heart of the distinctiveness and resilience of European national cultures.
Brussels is one European capital that appears to offer some of the most open conditions and
opportunities for foreign European residents to access the highly sought after benefits of a high
‘quality of life’ that remains the primary object of political and social struggle of urban dwelling
professionals. My study has offered indicative, if inconclusive, evidence of both its open and
closed dimensions. Although much can be said that is negative about Brussels, its relative
accessibility only really comes to light to light when the city is considered in comparative
perspective. Much further study of comparable places, such as Amsterdam, London and Paris,
will be needed to substantiate this, but it does seem clear that the peculiarly non-nationalized
situation of Brussels – between national cultures in a federal state – has given it certain
dimensions of openness that is not necessarily to be found in these other cities, that are habitually
seen as better or more obvious examples of truly internationalized cities.
The limited cross-national mobility of professionals in Europe suggests that the dominantly
national organization of access to ‘quality of life’ benefits might still constitute the major barrier
to sustained intra-European migration, despite the growing economic and cultural opportunities
of such movement. Capital cities offer the most open opportunities, but they are also the sites of
the most intense competition over resources and territory. For reasons to do with its location, its
complex cultural character, and its extraordinarily open housing market - as well as the sheernumber of foreign European residents in the city - Brussels is perhaps the European capital that
has been most physically marked, and internally transformed, by the free movement of
Europeans. However, as we have seen, the experience of these pioneers even here remains
somewhat marginal to the life of the city, as well as largely misunderstood by the host
population. The principle of free movement of persons, and the systematic breaking down of
national barriers to economic migration and re-settlement across borders in Europe, remains one
of the core achievements on paper of the European Union. Yet the difficulties of fulfilling this
kind of lifestyle, and the slight number of individuals willing to embark on a new and
complicated cross-national life, point towards how fragile the European dream remains in this
continent of still heavily nationalized nation states.Appendix
Figures for resident foreign populations (stocks) in Europe
EU citizens in the foreign population of the 15 member states
% Share of EU Citizen (approx absolute figures)















United Kingdom 40.4 1.4
(source: OECD-SOPEMI 2000)
Approx population figures of foreign EU residents (total population)
EU 15  5 500 000  (374 000 000)  = 1.5%
Belgium  562 100 (10 200 000)
Netherlands 190 200 (15 700 000)
UK 857 000 (59 000 000)
Germany  1 850 000 (82 000 000)
Denmark 48 900 (5 300 000)
(source: SOPEMI 1999)Secondary references
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